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RECENT DECISIONS
HOLMES v. PREFERRED PROPERTIES, INC.
In Holmes v. Preferred Properties, Inc., I the Connecticut
Supreme Court held that the provisions of section 20-325a(b) of the
Connecticut General Statutes2 were not applicable in an employ
ment contract suit brought by an employee-real estate salesman
against his employer-real estate agency for a share of commissions
paid to the agency by a seller procured by the salesman. 3 The court
reasoned that although listing contracts4 are governed exclusively by
section 20-325a, the plaintiffs written employment contract was an
undertaking separate and apart from the defendant's listing agree
ment with the seller. 5 Further, the court determined that compensa
tion due from a real estate broker to his salesman-employee is not a
"commission" within the meaning of General Statutes 20-325a. 6
The plaintiff in Holmes was an 82 year old licensed real estate
salesman who had been in the employ of Preferred Properties from
I. 190 Conn. 808, 462 A.2d 1057 (1983).
2. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-325a (1983) provides in pertinent part:
Actions to Recover Commissions Arising out of Real Estate Transactions.
(a) No person who is not licensed ... at the time he performed the acts or
rendered the services for which recovery is sought, shall commence or bring any
action in any court of this state, after October I, 1971, to recover any commis
sion, compensation or other payment in respect of any act done or service ren
dered by him, the doing or rendering of which is prohibited under the
provisions of this chapter. . . .
(b) No person, licensed under the provisions of this chapter, shall commence or
bring any action in respect of any acts done or services rendered after October
I, 1971, as set forth in subsection (a), unless such acts or services were rendered
pursuant to a contract or authorization from the person for whom such acts
were done or services rendered. To satisfy the requirements of this subsection
any such contract or authorization shall (I) be in writing, (2) contain the names
and addresses of all the parties thereto, (3) show the date on which such con
tract was entered into ... , (4) contain the conditions of such contract or au
thorization and (5) be signed by the parties thereto.
3. Holmes, 190 Conn. at 813, 462 A.2d at 1060.
4. See infra text accompanying n.15.
5. Holmes, 190 Conn. at 812, 462 A.2d at 1059.
6. /d. at 812-13, 462 A.2d at 1059-60.
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April 1977 to October 1978. 7 Following Mr. Holmes' discharge, the
defendant sold the land of a client whom Holmes had recruited. The
land was sold in two separate transactions, in 1980 and 1981, for
which the defendant received commissions of $18,000 and $5850, re
spectively.s The defendant also received a commission on the sale of
a new home to the same client in 1980, the exact amount of which
was in dispute. 9 Holmes filed suit in superior court seeking to re
cover a share of the commission paid to the defendant in connection
with these three transactions. The superior court, sitting without a
jury, rendered judgment for the defendant on the ground that the
requirements of General Statutes section 20-325a(b) were not met, in
that the employment contract between the parties lacked the plain
ti1fs address.1O The plaintiff appealed directly to the Connecticut
Supreme Court, II which found error in the superior court's applica
tion of section 20-325a to the employment contract and ordered a
new trial to consider the merits of the plainti1fs claim.12
Section 20-325a is essentially an extension of the statute of
frauds and is characteristic of statutes that many states have enacted
in an attempt to regulate contract formation in the real estate indus
try.13 Unless a contrary legislative intent is apparent, most courts
have interpreted the reach of such statutes to be limited to employ
ment agreements between owners of real estate and their brokers l4
- commonly called "listing contracts."15
In Revere Rea/ Estate v. Cerato, 16 the Connecticut Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff-brokerage firm's right to recover commis
sions depended, inter alia, upon whether its listing contract with the
defendant-seller contained the items enumerated in section 20
7. Id. at 810,462 A.2d at 1058-59.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 810 n.4, 462 A.2d at 1059 n.4.
10. Id. at 811, 462 A.2d at 1059.
11. Id. at 809, 462 A.2d at 1058.
12. Id. at 813, 462 A.2d at 1060.
13. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-101 (1967); CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1624
(Deering 1971); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 1978); MICH. COMPo LAWS
ANN. § 566.132 (West 1967); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 240.10 (West 1957).
14. E.g., Bush V. Mattingly, 62 Ariz. 483, 158 P.2d 665 (1945); Gorham v. Heiman,
90 Cal. 346,27 P. 289 (1891); Clark V. Ward, 117 Ind. App. 307, 70 N.E.2d 755 (1947);
Thompson v. Carey's Real Estate, 335 Mich. 474, 56 N.W.2d 255 (1953); Borisoff V.
Schatten, 335 Mich. 684, 57 N.W.2d 430 (1953); Dura v. Walker, Hart and Co., 27
N.Y.2d 346, 267 N.E.2d 83 (1971); Connerton V. Andrews, 195 Wis. 433, 218 N.W. 817
(1928). See supra note 13 for statutes that were at issue in the above cases.
15. See generally D. BURKE, LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS, pp. 38-49 (1982).
16. 186 Conn. 74, 438 A.2d 1202 (1982).
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325a(b),17 In William Pitt, Inc. v. Taylor,IS the court declared that
listing contracts were governed exclusively by section 20-325a and
that a sales contract between a buyer and seller of real estate was
beyond the scope of the statute. 19 The plaintiff in Taylor was a bro
ker who brought action to recover a commission for procuring a
ready, willing and able buyer. 2o The court held that the defendant
seller could not defend on the basis that he never signed the sales
contract with the buyer because the sales contract was an undertak
ing "separate and apart from the listing agreement," to which the
statute applied. 21
The court in Holmes cited its decision in Taylor as implicitly
rejecting the notion that all contracts relating to real estate must con
form to section 20-325a. 22 Applying the Taylor analysis, the Holmes
court concluded that the employment contract between the plaintiff
and defendant was separate and apart from the listing agreement
between the defendant and the landowner. 23 The court, however,
did not rely solely on the Taylor rationale. It also found section 20
325a inapplicable to the employment contract based upon the word
ing of the statute itself. The court interpreted the word "commis
sion" in section 20-325a as excluding compensation due from a real
estate broker to a salesman-employee. 24 Because the plaintiffs cause
of action arose out of the employment contract, the court reasoned
that it was not an action to recover a commission under section 20
325a. 25
The court's interpretation of the scope of section 20-325ain
Holmes does not reflect a literal reading of the statute, for there is
neither any wording explicitly limiting the statute's applicability to
listing contracts nor is there any language purporting to define "com
mission." On the contrary, subsection (b) contains the phrase "no
person" to describe who is precluded from bringing an action under
the statute. 26 Courts in other states with similar statutes, however,
have generally construed such broad wording to exclude agreements
17. Id. at 77, 438 A.2d at 1204.
18. 186 Conn. 82,438 A.2d 1206 (1982).
19.. Id. at 84,438 A.2d at 1208.
20. Id. at 82-83, 438 A.2d at 1207-1208.
21. Id. at 84, 438 A.2d at 1208.
22. Holmes, 190 Conn. at 812, 462 A.2d at 1059.
23. Id.
24. /d. at 812-13, 462 A.2d at 1959-60.
25. Id. at 812, 462 A.2d at 1060.
26. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-325a(b) (West Supp. 1983-84), see supra note 2
for text of the statute.
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between brokers, or agreements between brokers and their salesmen
employees, to share in commissions earned through their combined
effortsP
The Michigan Supreme Court has decided two cases involving
an issue nearly identical to the one in Holmes. In Thompson v. Ca
rey's Real Estate,28 the plaintiff, a real estate salesman, brought an
action against his employer, a real estate broker, for a commission
allegedly due him under an oral employment contract. 29 The broker
raised the statute of frauds in defense, the pertinent provisions of
which bears close resemblance to 20-325a. 30 In holding that the stat
ute did not apply to the employment agreement, the court empha
sized the fact that the relationship between the parties was one of
employer-employee. 3l It reasoned that since the validity of employ
ment agreements in other contexts were not generally measured
against the standards of the statute there was no reason, in the ab
sence of any language to the contrary, to read into the statute a legis
lative intent to give special treatment to employment contracts
between brokers and their salesmen. 32 The court in Thompson deter
mined that the legislative purpose, in adopting the statute, was to
protect real estate owners from unfounded claims by brokers for
commission. 33 In Borisojf v. Schallen,34 the Michigan Supreme
Court, faced with the identical issue presented in Thompson, af
firmed that decision and concluded that compensation due a real es
tate salesman from his broker-employer was not a "commission"
within the contemplation of the statute. 35
Unlike the Michigan court in Thompson, the Connecticut court
in Holmes did not examine the peculiar nature of the employment
relationship between a broker and his salesman, but nevertheless
reached the same result as the Michigan court-that the compensa
27. See supra notes \3 and 14.
28. 335 Mich. 474, 56 N.W.2d 255 (1953).
29. Id. at 475, 56 N.W.2d at 256.
30. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 566.\32 (West 1967) provides in part:
In the following cases specified in this section, every agreement. .. shall be
void, unless. . . in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or
by some person by him thereunto lawfully authorized, that is to say: 5. Every
agreement, promise or contract to pay any commission for or upon the sale of
any interest in real estate. . .
31. Thompson, 335 Mich. at 476,56 N.W.2d at 257.
32. Id. The employment agreements referred to were those contracts that were
performable within one year.
33. Id.
34. 335 Mich. 684, 57 N.W.2d 430 (1953).
35. /d. at 686, 57 N.W.2d at 431.
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tion due a salesman is not a "commission" under the statute
through a slightly different analysis. 36 The Holmes court ignored the
obvious difference in wording used in the Michigan statute. Section
20-325a refers to ". . . any commission, compensation or other pay
ment. .. ,"37 while the statutory provision interpreted in the Michi
gan cases relied on by the Connecticut court only mentions
"commissions."38 It is not unreasonable to infer that by adding the
phrase "compensation or other payment," the Connecticut legisla
ture did not intend to limit the scope of 20-325a to contracts involv
ing the payment of brokerage commissions by an owner of real
estate.
The court in Holmes, however, failed to consider this alternative
interpretation of 20-325a. Some courts have justified a broad appli
cation of such statutes either by construing such wording as "every
agreement" or "no person" literally, or by interpreting "commis7
sion" liberally so as to encompass any compensation paid to a bro
ker. 39 The courts that have adopted this approach have typically
argued that had the legislature intended a narrower scope for these
special statute of frauds provisions, it would have employed the ap
propriate limiting language. 4o Although a similar argument can be
made with respect to the language of 20-325a,41 the court in Holmes
completely disregarded precedent representing the broader
approach.
36. Ho/mes, 190 Conn. at 812-13, 462 A.2d at 1059-60. See supra text accompany
ing notes 21-24 and 27-31.
37. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 20-325a (West Supp. 1983-84), see supra note 2 for
text of the statute.
38. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 566-132 (West 1967), see supra note 29 for portion
of text of the statute.
39. See, e.g., Cohen V. P.I. Spitz Co., 121 Ohio St. I, 166 N.E. 804 (1929) (the court
held that the provision of the Ohio statute stating, "[n)o action shall be brought . . .
upon any agreement, promise or contract to pay any commission for or upon the sale of
an interest in real estate . . . ," was applicable to an oral agreement between brokers to
divide commission. /d. at 4-5, 166 N.E. at 805, (quoting GEN. CODE § 8621 (repealed».
The court asserted that the statutory wording was "clear and unambiguous,",containing
neither limitations nor exceptions, and that to construe the statute otherwise would nul
lify its plain purport.). Id See a/so Smith v. Starke, 196 Mich. 311,162 N.W. 998 (1917).
The court in Smith V. Starke held that the word "commission" implies a compensation to
a factor or other agent for services rendered in making a sale, and concluded that the
compensation plaintiff-broker was to receive under his oral contract with defendant-bro
ker was a commission within the meaning of the statute. The court further determined
that since the statute stated "every agreement for the payment of a commission," it was
not within the power of the court to read exceptions into the statute. Id. at 314-15, 162
N.W. at 999.
40. See, e.g., Smith v. Starke, 196 Mich. 311, 162 N.W. 998 (1917).
41. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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The Holmes court concluded its analysis by determining that
the contract between plaintiff and defendant was not for a commis
sion "but for a division of the fruits of their joint efforts" which come
to them from the owner in the shape of a commission. 42 In reaching
this determination, the court in Holmes relied on Dura v. Walker,
Hart and Co. ,43 in which the New York Court of Appeals held that
the statute of frauds 44 did not apply to an agreement between two
finders to share in a commission. 45 The New York court asserted
that the purpose of the statute was to prevent fraudulent claims for
commissions by business brokers and finders against employers, and
not to prevent claims by one broker, or finder, against another. 46
The court reasoned that the plaintiff's theory of recovery was similar
to that of a joint venture with its consequent fiduciary obligations,
and that no writing was required for such agreements. 47 What the
parties actually contracted for, the court concluded, was not the pay
ment of a commission, but "a division of the fruits of their joint ef
forts" which had come to them from the owner in the shape of a
commission. 48
The court in Holmes may have misplaced its reliance upon
Dura for its 'joint efforts" analysis because the New York court
based its interpretation of the scope of the New York statute49 on
express statements of legislative intent documented in the N.Y. Law
Revision Commission's Report. 5o The Connecticut court was unable
to point to any comparable legislative guidance.
The court's narrow construction of the scope of section 20-325a
was also unsupported by the legislative history of the statute. Since
its effective date, the Connecticut legislature has twice amended the
language of section 20-325a and in neither instance did it attempt to
clarify the ambiguous wording relating to the scope of the statute,51
42. Holmes, 190 Conn. 808, 812-13,462 A.2d 1057, 1060.
43. 27 N.Y.2d 346, 267 N.E.2d 83, 318 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1971).
44. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 1978), see supra note 13 for text of
the statute ..
45. Dura, 27 N.Y.2d at 349, 267 N.E.2d at 84, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 291.
46. /d.
47. /d. at 351-52, 267 N.E.2d at 86, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
48. /d.
49. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701 (McKinney 1978), see supra note 13 for text of
the statute.
50. Dura, 27 N.Y.2d at 349-50, 267 N.E.2d at 84-85, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 291 (citing
1949 report of N.Y. LAW REV. COMM., N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 65(G), 615 (1949».
51. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-325a (1983) (1972 P.A. 175, deleted from three places
in the first sentence, the word "such" following the words "no," "or bring any" and
"respect of any." 1973 P.A. 73-29 amended the first sentence of subsection (b) by in
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despite the significant amount of litigation in other states over the
am biguity of similar statutes. 52
The Holmes decision is also vulnerable to attack on policy
grounds. The evil sought to be avoided by statute of frauds provi
sions such as 20-325a is financial harm resulting from fraud or mis
representation by dishonest real estate brokers. This objective is
potentially compromised by adherence to a rule which in practical
effect condemns fraudulent practices by brokers in their transactions
with landowner-clients, and yet permits such abuses in the context of
broker-salesman employment relationships. A narrow construction
of a statute which could reasonably be read as extending to broker
salesman transactions, arguably reflects a weak or ambivalent judi
cial and legislative concern over the extent of the problem or the
need to enact regulatory measures to control it. Furthermore, the
Holmes decision leaves the door open to fraudulent dealings be
tween brokers and their salesmen which potentially creates problems
of as great a magnitude as those created by brokers and sellers.53
The court's ruling in Holmes, however, is not surprising in light
of both its prior treatment of 20-325a in Ceralo and Taylor, and the
factual similarity between Holmes and the two Michigan cases relied
upon by the court. 54 The soundness of the court's analysis in reach
ing its result, however, is called into question for the following rea
sons: first, the court failed to initially examine the express wording
of section 20-325a and any relevant legislative history in attempting
to discern how broadly the legislature intended that the statute was
to operate; second, the court refused to point out and reconcile not
only those cases that have held statutes similar to 20-325a applicable
to broker-salesman employment agreements, but also the distin
guishable facts of the cases upon which it relied;55 and finally, there
serting "licensed under this chapter" following "no person" and by inserting "as set forth
in subsection (a)" following "rendered after October I, 1971.").
52. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 14 and 37.
53. See Dura v. Walker, Hart & Co., 27 N.Y.2d 346,351,267 N.E.2d 83, 85, 318
N.Y.S.2d 289, 292 (1971).
54. Holmes, 190 Conn. at 813, 462 A.2d at 1060. See supra notes 27-34 and accom
panying text.
55. One such factual distinction was the different wording in the MiChigan statute.
See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. In addition, every case relied upon by the
Holmes court involved the enforceability of an oral agreement of employment, while the
employment agreement in the present case was written. In this regard, it is interesting to
note that the defendant produced the written contract, of which the plaintiff had no rec
ollection, during the course of the trial. This tactic leads one to wonder whether the
defendant was attempting to preserve a possible ground for distinguishing such cases as
Cohen v. PJ. Spitz Co., 121 Ohio St. I, 166 N.E. 804 (1929) and Smithy. Starke, 196

252

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:245

is an implicit inconsistency between the court's decision and the pub
lic policy against fraudulent dealings by dishonest real estate
brokers.
Michael Auger

Mich. 311, 162 N.W. 998 (1917), discussed in note 39 supra, in the event the court
adopted the approach advanced in those cases.

